New online commentary: A new transatlantic trade and tech agenda: economic security standards can address the EU’s and Washington’s concerns about China

In both Washington and European capitals, strengthening economic security and technological resilience has become a core objective. But the EU and the US disagree on the how. The EU’s proposal to develop economic security standards with like-minded partners offers the most promising starting point for achieving shared goals.

Democrats and Republicans agree on little these days. The need to counter China’s technological ascendance and industrial dominance is a notable exception. Trump 2.0 is likely to demand additional EU measures to achieve this. Trump’s aides expect the EU to deliver tangible results within months.

If the EU does not proactively engage with Washington, the US will move forward without considering EU interests. Trump 2.0 could make security guarantees for Europe against Russia conditional on a tougher EU China policy. After all, Trump 1.0 already warned that the US might limit intelligence sharing if EU Member States allowed Huawei to be included in their 5G networks. Trump 2.0 could pressure Europeans into a degree of decoupling from China. Washington may close its market to EU products containing China-manufactured components. For reasons of national security, Washington may well halt imports of European electric vehicles if they rely on sensors or batteries produced in China. US restrictions on EU tech exports could extend far beyond semiconductors: Washington may also try to prevent the sale of a wider range of EU-produced goods, ranging from wafers to optical devices, to China. If Washington finds that allies are not moving fast enough, Trump 2.0 could expand US extraterritorial controls to block EU tech companies’ exports to China directly.

How to act on this situation? Read the full online commentary that I penned with Joris Teer on the website of the EUISS.