New online commentary: Trade, Tech and Taiwan: Crafting a transatlantic China agenda

The incoming Trump team is convinced that the EU’s China policy is too slow and indecisive. But the EU has a chance to exert influence if it moves swiftly to make a ‘China pitch’ focused on ‘three Ts’: trade, tech and Taiwan.

President-elect Donald Trump wants to break with Biden-era policies in most fields, but not necessarily on China. His aides proudly claim that President Biden’s approach is a continuation of Trump’s first-term hawkish policy. The incoming president himself is famous for his erratic policymaking style. But he also holds two contradictory convictions that shape his thinking on China. In other words, given competing impulses and potentially conflicting views among his aides, Trump has yet to formulate a clear China policy.

On the one hand, Trump’s deep scepticism of alliances may lead him to treat China like any other country. Trump could be inclined to act pragmatically and seek a top-down understanding in leader-to-leader exchanges with China’s President Xi Jinping. For example, on the campaign trail, Trump took a transactional approach to the conflict over Taiwan. Such a policy could involve striving for another ‘China deal’ following the ‘Phase One deal’ that Trump concluded with Beijing in his first term. Interestingly, Trump has not hinted at such a deal, possibly because many in his team, including Robert Lighthizer, consider the previous deal a failure.

For the EU, a deal-making Trump bears enormous risks. Initially, Trump might be inclined to call on Europe to team up and put pressure on China. However, unlike during his first term, China would likely retaliate, and Europe is more vulnerable to such repercussions than the US. Once the negotiations have started, Trump could insist on favourable conditions for US firms’ access to the Chinese market, placing European competitors at a distinct disadvantage.

What can the EU do? Find out in my new online commentary on the website of the EUISS.